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LOYALTY AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT: THE RIGHT OF
EMPLOYERS TO DISCHARGE SUSPECTED SUBVERSIVES*
MANY private employers have followed the lead of governmental employers,
federal,' state,2 and local,3 and have instituted formal programs for screening
their employees' loyalty to the United States.4 And other private employers,
although not initiating formal programs, have simply discharged employees
suspected of being disloyal.5 The natural antipathy of employers toward sus-
pected subversives has been translated into such action by world developments
*The Editors wish to acknowledge their obligation to the Louis S. Weiss Fund, Inc.
The Weiss Fund made a gift to Yale University in memory of Louis S. Weiss, '15, for
a study, in the Law School, of loyalty and security programs affecting employment, The
research on which this Comment is based was largely made possible by that grant. The
responsibility for this Comment is, of course, the Editors'.
1. On loyalty programs for federal employees, see, in general, Emerson & Helfeld,
Loyalty Among Government Employees, 58 YAI L.J. 1 (1948); Richardson, Tie
Federal Employee Loyalty Program, 51 COL. L. REV. 546 (1951) ; Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd without opinion, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). See also
BARTH, THE LOY.LT, OF FREE MEN (1951) ; BIDDLE, THE FEAR OF FREEDOM (1951) ;
EMERSON & HABER, CIVIL LiBERTIES N THE UNITED STATES 528 et seq. (1952); GEu-
HORN, SECURITY, LOYALTY AND ScmNcz (1950); WEYL, THE BATTLE AGAINST Dis-
LOYALTY (1951).
2. The programs of several states are discussed in THE STATES AND SUBVERSION
(Gellhorn ed. 1952). See also CHAMBERLAIN, LOYALTY AND LEGISLATVr AcTioN (1951);
Byse, A Report on, the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act, 101 U. oF PA. L. REv. 480 (1953);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). For the closely related subject of state
loyalty measures for licensed professions, see Brown & Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Ad-
mission, to the Bar, 20 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 480 (1953).
3. See, e.g., Horowitz, A Report on the Los Angeles City and County Loyalty Pro-
grams, 5 STAN. L. REy. 233 (1953) ; Mowitz, Michigan: State and Local Attack on Sub.
version in THE STATES AND SUBVERSION 184 (Gellhorn ed. 1952); EMERSON & HABJM,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 578; Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S.
716 (1951).
4. For an analysis of many of these programs, see NATIONAL INDUSTUAL CONFER-
ENCE BOARD, INDUSTRIAL SECURITY: COMBATING SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE (1952). Most
of these programs include the screening of prospective employees as well as present em-
ployees and the issues involved are similar; but the scope of this Comment is restricted to
discharge measures.
5. See cases cited notes 54, 56-7, 60-1, 98-108 infra.
6. See Government measures affecting private employment cited note 95 infra, And
see United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, C.I.O. v. Lilienthal, 84
F. Supp. 640 (D.D.C. 1949); MUNITIONS BOARD, STANDARDS FOR PLANT PROTECTION 16
(Dep't Def. 1950).
7. See, e.g., Kingston Cake Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1445 (1952) ; In the Matter of Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1948); Administrative Rulings of NLRB General
Counsel, Case No. 72 (March 30, 1951), 27 LABOR RE,. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1510 (1951).
Many labor unions have their own loyalty programs. See, e.g., COMMUNIST DOMINATION
OF CERTAIN UNIONS, SEN. Doc. No. 89, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); Weinstock v.
LOYALTY AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
and pressure from the Government, 6 labor unions,7 management associations,
consumer groups,9 and veterans' organizations.1 0
Comparatively little information is available on the formal procedures used
to check on the loyalty of employees in private industry. Some employers
make use of the files of the House Un-American Activities Committee, or
similar state committees, or the facilities of state or local police anti-subver-
sive units." Some hire investigators to conduct their own field investi-
gations 12 or subscribe to the loyalty investigating services of private agen-
cies.' 3 And many employers require employees to fill out questionnaires
divulging their affiliations, or require an affidavit of non-membership in or-
ganizations on the Attorney General's list.14 But the great bulk of information
on loyalty is probably obtained less formally.5 Employers can simply direct
Ladisk-y, 197 Misc. 859, 93 N.Y.S2d 85 (Sup. Ct 1950). These are aided by the non-
communist affidavit requirement of the Taft-Hartley Act. Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, § 9(h), 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (Supp. 1952) ; Greenvald,
Non-Co-mmunist A-fldavits: Taft-Hartley Sound and Fury- 12 LA. L Rnv. 407 (1952).
S. See, e.g., NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CoNxrEnmcE BOARD, op. cit. supra note 4; U.S.
CHAMBER OF CoMIERcE, COMUNISTS WITHIN THE LABOR MovMM.nI! (1947); U.S.
CHA=MER OF ComMRcE, A PROGRAM FOR CoyuTx.-,r- A:.i-Con.ituNisT Acrio: (1943).
9. For many examples, see MIT-- THE JUDGES AND THE: JUI2GED (1952).
10. The most notorious instigator has been the American Legion. For an e.'ample of
the power of the Legion, see N.Y. Times, May 23, 1952, p. 1; EMEsoN & HAnAR, op. di.
supra note 1, at 578.
11. See BARTH, op. cit. .pra note 1, at 63 et scq.; HousE CommiTrr-m o.- UN-
A= acAx AcrvrmIs, ANN. REP. 77 (1952) ; NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COrZM-c.E BOARD,
op. cit. smpra note 4, at 55.
12. Ibid. Many special agents of the FBI have been lured to jobs in private industry
where they can put their anti-subversive training to work as directors of private loyalty
programs. LOwENTHAL, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 353 et seq. (1950);
Business Week, July 20, 1946, p. 19.
13. American Business Consultants, Inc., was organized by a group of ex-FBI agents
to conduct loyalty investigations for private employers. This same organization publishes
an anti-communist newsletter, Counterattach, and was the publisher of Red Clannels.
See 'MIEE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 61 ct seq., for a discussion of this organization. Dun
& Bradstreet Corp., with main office in New York City and branch offices throughout
the country, undertakes to make loyalty investigations for employers on a subscription
contract basis.
14. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CoxFERENcE BOARD, op. cit. spra note 4, at 52 et scq.;
see note 127 infra.
15. For a general discussion of the procedures and sources of information for private
loyalty programs, see NATIONAL INDUsTRIAL CoIrnFEcn BoAD, op. cii. supra note 4,
at 55. The methods are summarized as:
"1. Making inquiries by correspondence including the use of form letters. ....
2. Making inquiries through telephone contacts.
3. Using services of outside investigators and non-company fact finding agencies.
4. Conducting field investigations by company investigators.
5. Making inquiries through local and national law enforcement agencies."
See also How Yoa Can Find Out About a Mae's Subzrsih, Affiliations Be!ore Hiring
Him, Public Relations News, Aug. 9, 1948, p. I.
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inquiries to personal references or prior employers.' 0 Moreover, they often
become aware of facts relative to their employees through chance: newspaper
or magazine reports may link an employee with a subversive group; or an
employee may be called to testify before one of the numerous Government
investigating committees and may even claim the Fifth Amendment as a
ground for not testifying.
Where an employee is actually found guilty of an overt act of disloyalty
to the Government, no problem faces the employer. Criminal conviction
effectively serves to terminate the employment relationship.17 But where
there is only suspicion of disloyalty, the employer must either retain the in-
dividual on his payroll or take affirmative action to discharge him. Continued
employment of the suspected worker may seem undesirable in the employer's
eyes for a variety of reasons: the employer may find it utterly repugnant to
have in his employ a person who is not "one hundred percent American";
he may be engaged in war production and may fear that such an individual
might sabotage his plant; he may be engaged in one of the media of com-
munication and may fear that the employee will distort information or at-
tempt by innuendo to influence public opinion; he may face present or
potential unrest in his plant arising from the reluctance of other employees
to work beside a "red"; or he may face possible loss of public patronage as
a result of his tolerance of such an individual.
From the viewpoint of the suspected employee, however, discharge on
disloyalty grounds has very serious consequences. Once a man is fired
for such a reason, his opportunities for further employment are extremely
limited. Prospective employers customarily check prior employers and are not
likely to hire anyone whose loyalty has been questioned. Furthermore, the
very publicity often accompanying such a discharge-especially where pro-
voked by such a publicized event as testimony before an investigating com-
mittee-may further injure the employee's reputation. Thus an individual
may suffer irreparable injury without ever having an opportunity to prove
his loyalty to the United States. An employer may interpret the expression
of minority political beliefs as indicative of subversion. Or the employee may
have unwittingly loaned his name to an organization not knowing it was a
communist front. Should an innocent individual be injured by discharge on
grounds of suspected disloyalty, he may, of course, bring an action for defama-
tion against the employer.' 8 But a prudent employer can make it very difficult
16. The Federal Loyalty Review Board has changed its prior contrary rule and will
now report to inquiring private employers the fact of an adverse decision on an employee
or the fact that the employee left Government employ before his screening was completed.
FLRB, Memo. No. 45, July 26, 1949.
17. The criminal statutes are collected in Tn. STATES AND SuBvERsiox, App. (Gell-
horn ed. 1952) ; LFvis, LAws RELATING TO ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE, Erc. (1952). See also
EmERsoN & HABzR, op. cit. mspra note 1, at 458 et seq.; Dennis v. 'United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951).
18. See the statement of the arbitrator note 103 infra. Some courts have held that
accusations of communism, subversion, or disloyalty are per se defamatory. See, e.g.,
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for a discharged employee to win such an action by being careful to limit both
the nature and publication of his charges.19
In view of the serious nature of these problems faced by both employer
and employee, each party should be aware of his own rights in regard to
discharge on grounds of suspected disloyalty. At common law, in the absence
of a contract, a private employer has an absolute right to discharge anyone
in his employ without cause.20 A growing social recognition of a worker's
Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947); Wright v. Farm Journal, 15S F.2d 976
(2d Cir. 1947). But other courts disagree. See, e.g., Keefe %. O'Brien, 116 N.Y.S2d
286, 288 (Sup. Ct. 1952), 28 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 374 (1953), where the court said:
"To hold that calling one a communist is slander would unwittingly trap the unwary,
for nothing would please communists better than to enable them to institute suits for
damages promiscuously, regardless of ultimate outcome. It has been amply demonstrated
that it is part of communist doctrine and strategy to make the courtroom its forum for
propaganda purposes. . . . [T]he court will take judicial notice of the cold war now
existing between our form of government and communism. Our safety is therefore best
served by an exposure of communists and communism. It is far better, therefore, to allow
free play of our emotions in dealing with persons whom we believe to be communists
rather than to seal the lips of people who might be frightened into silence and suppres-
sion lest use of the word 'communist' should per se force upon them costly litigation"
There are apparently no reported cases deciding whether accusations of "doubt as to
loyalty" or being "a poor security risk," for example, are defamatory. But cf. Matson v.
'Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d S92 (1952) (statement in letter from State Attorney
General to District Attorney regarding subordinate's alleged communist activities which
were alleged to make her a security risk held libelous per se but privileged). The
numerous cases are collected in Notes, 51 A.L.R. 1071 (1927), 171 A.LR. 709 (1947).
The injured party may also have an action against an informer. See Foltz v. Moore
McCormack Lines, 189 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1951) (one maliciously giving information to
FBI may be sued for libel by one injured thereby). Cf. Van Knorr v. Miles, C F. Supp.
962 (D. Mass. 1945), remanded for dismissal for lach of jurisdition, 156 F.2d 287 (1st
Cir. 1946) ; Barile v. Fisher, 94 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. 1949) ; Matson v. Margiotti,
supra.
19. Truth is, of course, a defense to a defamation action. And such actions are
usually tried to a jury. See, generally, ProssEm, TorTs 777 et seq. (1941). For some of
the problems of defending such an action, see Utah Farm Bureau Federation v. National
Farmers Union Service, 198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1952) ("communist dominated"). And
for an interesting recent discussion of the problem of proving publication, see Mims v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 F.2d SO (5th Cir. 1952) (employee claimed he was dis-
charged for refusal to contribute to Sen. Taft's campaign and that the alleged ground for
discharge-inefficiency-was defamatory).
20. See Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1953) and cases
therein cited. For an interesting variation, see Harmon v. United Mine Workers of
America, 166 Ark. 255, 266 SAV. 84 (1924), where a discharged employee sued his union
for prevailing upon his employer to discharge him after expelling him from the union
for being a member of the Ku Klux Klan. In affirming dismissal the court said: "There
can be no damages resulting to an employee on account of a discharge from an employ-
ment at will. The motive of the employer in discharging him is immaterial, and cannot
be questioned. The discharge may have been inspired by a bad motive, for the legal right
to determine an employment at will is absolute in either the employer or the employee."
Id. at 258, 266 S.W. at 85.
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"property right" in his job, however, has resulted in state and federal statutes
placing some restrictions on this hitherto unlimited power.21 And labor unions,
by collective bargaining contracts, have further circumscribed management's
discretion to fire workers. These statutes and agreements were not generally
drafted to meet the problem of loyalty discharges. But they provide the only
possible restrictions upon a private employer's absolute right to discharge
employees suspected of disloyalty. As such, they represent the only "rights"
available to the suspected employee.
STATE STATUTES
State statutes place varying limitations on the permissible substantive
grounds for discharge of employees.2 Two common types could be inter-
preted as placing some restrictions on private loyalty measures: the Fair
Employment Practices acts, presently in force in about a quarter of the
states;23 and statutes, in effect in about half the jurisdictions, which pro-
21. On an employee's right to his job, see, generally, RowLAxD, THE LEGAL PRo-
TECTION OF THE WORKER'S JOB (1937); Frank, The Right to Work, 6 IND. & LAD,
REL. REV. 247 (1952) ; Lenhoff, The Right to Work: Here and Abroad, 46 ILL. L. REV,
669 (1951).
22. In addition to the types of statutes discussed in notes 23 and 24 infra: Massa-
chusetts prohibits discrimination on account of age between 45 and 65; Louisiana makes
it illegal to discriminate on account of age under 50 unless an approved pension plan Is
in effect; eight states (Iowa, Ky., Me., Mass., N.M., N.Y., Ohio, Wash.) prohibit dis-
charge because of membership in militia, national guard, or similar organization; three
(N.M., Ohio, Wis.) require reinstatement of employees returning from military service
(with broad exceptions) and prohibit discharge of reinstated employees within one year
except for cause; two (Mass., Miss.) prohibit discharge because of absence for, or activ-
ities on, a jury; twelve states (Calif., Kan., La., Mass., Minn., Nev., N.D., Okla., Ore.,
Pa., R.I., Utah) prohibit discrimination for testifying or making complaint to certain
specified state agencies, usually the Wage and Hour Board; about two-thirds of the
states have provisions in some way similar to the federal labor relations law aimed at
prevention of discrimination in hiring or firing because of union membership or activi-
ties.
Contractual limitations also are imposed: A few states deny validity to a personal
service contract running more than two years; several states provide that a contract for
employment even for a specified term is terminable by the employer for willful breach
or habitual neglect of duty, or for continued incapacity; several states also codify the
common law by providing that employment for no specified term is terminable at the
will of either party; and about two-thirds of the states limit the right to contract with
regard to membership or non-membership in labor unions.
23. Fourteen states have some form of such statute (Cal., Colo., Conn., Ill., Ind.,
Mass., Neb., N.J., N.M., N.Y., Ore., R.I., Wis., Wash.). The eleven broadest of these
are summarized in Hearings before Subcommittee on Labor and La or-Hangeinent Re-
lations of the Coinmittee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 1732 and S. 551, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 380-3 (1952). See also CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1735, 1777.6 (Deering, Supp, 1951) ;
ILL. STAT. ANN. §§29-17-24, 29-24a-q (Smith-Hurd, 1936); Nm. REV. STAT. §48-215
(1943). See, generally, GRAVES, ANTI-DscRimINATioN LEGISLATION IN THI AmERCAu
STATES (1948); Murray, The Right to Equal Opportunity in Employnent, 33 CAIF .
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hibit employer interference with an employee's right to vote or political ac-
tivity. 2  But the only decisions thus far have held the protection of such
statutes unavailable to persons discharged on disloyalty grounds.
Fair Employment Practices acts generally prohibit employers from asling
employees questions which might indicate their race, religion, creed, or na-
tional origin.-5 The New York Committee has held, however, that questions
about membership in organizations on the Attorney General's list do not vio-
late that state's act.20 And none of the states has interpreted its statute to
restrict in any way the discharge of suspected subversives.
Statutes prohibiting employer coercion of employee political activities appear
on their face to be a more formidable hurdle to private loyalty programs. But
in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cot,, - the
L. REv. 3'8 (1945) ; Roper, Discrimination in Induvstry, 5 I-m. & L. %B . v. 5M
(1952).
A few of these statutes do not restrict all employers, and a few prescribe no sanction
but merely state a public policy. All of these statutes prohibit discrimination on account
of race, creed, color, ancestry, or national origin. New Jersey adds to these discrimination
because of liability for military service, Massachusetts adds age, and Oregon adds sex
and union membership. These statutes generally also prohibit discrimination against
employees for opposing practices condemned by the acts.
24. Cal., Colo., Conn., Fla., Kan., Ky., Md., Minn., Miss., 'Mo., Mont, Neb., N.Y.,
Ohio, Okla., Pa., S.C., S.D., Texas, Utah, NV. Va., Wis., Wyo. Although varing con-
siderably, these statutes generally make it a penal offense for an employer to interfere
with the vote of his employees. See, e.g., WVo. Comp. STrAx. A.. § 31-2317 (1945):
"Employers not to interfere with political rights of employees.-It shall be unlawful
for any employer to make, adopt, enforce or attempt to enforce any order, rule, regu-
lation or policy forbidding or preventing any employee from becoming a candidate for
public office or for a position on any public board or commission or to make, adopt, en-
force or attempt to enforce any order, rule, or regulation controlling or attempting to con-
trol such employee's vote on any question at any public election, or in any public positiva
or board or in any office to which such employee may be appointed or elected."
Five states have considerably broader provisions. Louisiana and Missouri have statutes
similar to that of California. See note 29 infra. Miss. Coon Aiiii. § 5335 (1942) pro-
vides:
"Social, civil and political rights of employees protected. Any corporation doing busi-
ness in this state shall be liable to a penalty of two hundred and fifty dollars for every
unlawful interference with the social, civil, or political rights of any of its agents or
employees, and the same may be recovered by suit, to be brought by the injured party."
S.C. CoDE oF LAws § 16-559 (1952) provides:
"Whoever shall assault or intimidate any citizen because of political opinions or the
exercise of political rights and privileges guaranteed to every citizen of the United States
by the Constitution and laws thereof or by the Constitution and laws of this State, or,
for such reason, discharge such citizen from employment or occupation or eject such
citizen from rented house or land or other property shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor...."
25. See Hearings, supra note 23, at 3S0-3.
26. See Note, Inquiries in New York About Subersiv Membership, 28 LAn. RE..
REP. (Ref. Man.) 96 (1951).
27. 28 Cal.2d 431, 171 P.2d 21 (1946).
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Supreme Court of California held that one of the most comprehensive of
such state statutes did not prohibit an employer from discharging employees
whose loyalty to the United States had not been established to his satisfac-
tion.28 The statute prohibits employers from adopting or enforcing any rule
or policy "controlling or directing, or tending to control or direct the political
activities or affiliations of employees," or from coercing or influencing or at-
tempting to coerce or influence employees "through or by means of threat of
discharge or loss of employment to adopt or refrain from adopting or follow-
ing any particular course or line of political action or activity." 29 The court
reasoned that this wording was not intended to protect any individual or group
advocating the overthrow of the Government by force or violence. "On the
contrary, the words 'politics' and 'political' imply orderly conduct of govern-
ment, not revolution."30 Thus in the court's view, since subversion is not
within the realm of protected political activity, discharge because of suspected
disloyalty is not within the area proscribed by the statute.
28. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. discharged eighteen employees because it did not have
sufficient information to satisfy itself as to their loyalty. These employees sued for
wrongful discharge, relying on the California statute. When Lockheed's demurrer was
overruled it brought an action for a writ of prohibition against the court to restrain fur-
ther proceedings on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional. Lockheed claimed
that the section imposed an unjustifiable limitation on its right to contract and that it
interfered with management's free speech. Moreover, they contended that, even if con-
stitutional, the statute was penal and provided no civil right of action. The court held
that the statute did create a civil right of action, but also 'held that "we find nothing in
the section to prevent an employer engaged in producing vital war materials from dis-
charging an employee who advocates the overthrow of our government by force or vio-
lence or whose loyalty to the United States has not been established to the satisfaction
of the employer." Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
28 Cal.2d 481, 485, 171 P.2d 21, 24 (1946). As interpreted, the court held the statute
constitutional. Cf. Santiago v. People of Puerto Rico, 154 F.2d 811 (1st Cir. 1946). In
affirming the conviction of an employer under a similar Puerto Rican statute for discharg-
ing an employee because of his affiliation with the Popular Democratic Party, the court
said '"neither the act nor the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico gives the slightest intimation
that a property owner may be deprived of his right to protect his property from the de-
structive acts of his employees." Id. at 813.
29. CAL. LABOR CoDE §§ 1101-2 (Deering, 1943):
"1101. Rule, regulation or policy as to political activities or affiliations. No employer
shall make, adopt or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy:
(a). Forbidding or preventing employees from engaging or participating in politics
or becoming candidates for public office.
(b). Controlling or directing, or tending to control or direct the political activities
or affiliations of employees.
"1102. Coercing or influencing political activities of employees. No employer shall
coerce or influence or attempt to coerce or influence his employees through or by means
of threat of discharge or loss of employment to adopt or follow or refrain from adopting
or following any particular course or line of political action or political activity."
30. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 28 Cal.2d
481, 485, 171 P.2d 21, 24 (1946).
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Although state statutes may provide no substantive obstacles to discharge on
loyalty grounds, certain statutes limiting the procedures which may be used
to effectuate discharge may place some restrictions on private loyalty pro-
grams.31 For example, Ohio and Nevada prohibit firing or disciplining of
an employee upon report of a company detective, spotter, or spy where the
reason involves a question of integrity or honesty, unless a hearing is ac-
corded.3 2 A Minnesota statute prohibits an employer's spying on employees'
activities "in the exercise of their legal rights."-3 New York prohibits the
fingerprinting of employees by employers, subject to certain exceptions.34
And about half the states make it a criminal offense for an employer to black-
list an employee or to maintain a blacklist.35 But no cases have yet held these
provisions applicable to employer loyalty measures.
Most of these statutes were enacted in the past to deal with then-current
problems completely unrelated to employee loyalty. It is therefore to be ex-
pected that courts and boards will be reluctant to construe them as limiting
the right of private employers to police the loyalty of their employees. But a
31. Procedural restrictions other than those discussed notes 32-5 infra include the
following: four states (' Me., Mass., Pa., Wis.) provide that if an employer requires
notice of quitting from an employee he must give comparable notice of firing to such
employee; nine (Fla., Ind., Kan., Mo., Mont., NOb., N.M., Okla., Te.-xas) require that
upon request an employer must give a discharged employee a statement of his service
and the reason for discharge.
32. OHio GEN,. CODE A.N. § 12956-1 (Page, 1937) ; NEV. Coxw. L ws § 2770 (Hill-
yer, 1929).
33. Mimi. STAT. ANNr. § 179.12(5) (1946).
34. N.Y. LAoR L-Aw § 201-a.
35. See, e.g., CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 97, §§,Q3-9 (1935); Comz.. rPv. Strr. §0,531
(1949). Several states also provide a civil remedy for blacklisting, including treble
damage suits and recovery of attorney fees. See, e.g., IoWA CODE Am;N. §736.2 (1949).
In addition, blacklisting is an unfair labor practice under several state labor relations
acts and thus grounds for a suit to require hiring or reinstatement and back pay. See,
e.g., MixN. STT.m ANN. § 179.12 (1946). The criminal statutes vary considerably but
they are generally broad enough to cover other blacklists than of union organizers or
members.
36. But see Barile v. Fisher, 94 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. 1949), where the court up-
held a denial of a motion to dismiss in an action by an employee against a union for caus-
ing him to be discharged. The employee was fired upon his union's request after he
refused to pay dues to the union because its officers refused to sign non-communist affi-
davits. The court held that the allegation that the union caused him to be blacklisted
stated a cause of action. See also the report of the filing of a suit for Z5l,7z0,0G0 damages
by 22 ex-members of the movie industry against 17 film companies, two producer asso-
ciations, 20 movie executives, 9 Congressmen on the House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee, and 2 committee investigators; the plaintiffs alleged that they had been made job-
less pariahs as a result of having been named on a movie industry blacklist for refusal
to answer questions of the Committee, etc. A permanent injunction against "maintaining
any blacklist or policy of blacklisting or discriminating against the plaintiffs . . . with
respect to employment in the motion picture industry" vas also requested. Time, March
23, 1953, p. 108.
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strong argument can be made that the California-type statute was designed
to curb just this type of employer activity.8 7 The mere fact that the minority
political beliefs seeking protection today are particularly repugnant should
not obviate the application of such statutes. They were designed to protect
any employee political activities-so long as they are not criminal aS-regard-
less of public antipathy to such beliefs. And the more distasteful the employee's
beliefs, the more necessary the statute. Despite the persuasiveness of this
argument, however, the California rationale will probably be followed else-
where if the question arises again. The general attitude of courts toward sus-
pected subversives today is not friendly. 0 Moreover, the profusion of loyalty
measures passed by federal and state legislatures 40 indicates that an inter-
pretation of such a statute which protected the job of a communist might re-
sult in immediate amendment or repeal of the statute.
Even if courts should properly construe such statutes as not protecting from
discharge persons who advocate overthrow of the Government by force or
violence,41 the California court in the Lockheed case went further than neces-
37. The purpose of this statute is discussed in Note, 35 CAF. L. REV. 310 (1947).
38. See the lower court decision in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, 153 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1944).
39. See, e.g., note 122 infra.
40. See notes 1 and 2 suipra.
Two states have statutes which appear expressly to sanction some private loyalty
programs. MONT. Ray. CODE §77-606 (1947), dealing with reemployment of persons
completing military or naval service, provides:
"Policy respecting members of communist party or German-American Bund. It is
expressed policy of the legislature of the state of Montana that wherever a vacancy is
caused in the employment rolls of any business or- industry by reason of induction into
the service of the United States of an employee pursuant to the provisions of said selec-
tive training act of 1940, or the national guard and reserve officers mobilization act such
vacancy shall not be filled by any person who is a member of the communist party or the
German-American Bund."
This provision provides no sanction and it does not appear ever to have been involved
in litigation. The Oregon Discriminatory Practice Act, ORE. COMP. LAws ANN. 102-
8a02 (Supp. 1947), after prohibiting certain types of discrimination states:
"Provided that no one professing or admitting membership in an organization believ-
ing in the overthrow of the nation by force need be employed."
Ohio, by an Act of 1949, has declared that persons who advocate or belong to organi-
zations that advocate overthrow of the Government by force or violence are not entitled
to unemployment relief. OHio GEN. CODE § 1345-6 c(4) (Supp. 1950), Dworkin v. Col-
lopy, 56 Ohio Law Abstract 513, 91 N.E.2d 564 (C.P. 1950) (constitutionality upheld).
See, also, Emergency Relief Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 611 et seq., 15 U.S.C. §§ 721-8 (1948).
Compare United States v. Hautau, 43 F. Supp. 507 (D.N.J. 1942), with United States
v. Schneider, 45 F. Supp. 848 (D. Wis. 1942).
41. But compare the criticism of this policy by Professor Chafee:
"Driving Communists out of their chosen occupations and putting a stigma on them
which makes it almost impossible to obtain any other useful employment will not turn
such persons into decent American citizens. Instead, they will be more embittered than
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sary in declaring its statute inapplicable whenever an employee's loyalty is not
proven "to the satisfaction of the employer."' 42 By merely stating that his
reason for discharge is lack of satisfaction with an employee's loyalty, an
employer, under this rationale, can coerce conformity with his own political
views or abstention from political activity. For example, application of the
California Supreme Court's standard would uphold an employer if he in good
faith believes that membership in the American Legion or Americans for
Democratic Action makes a person's loyalty doubtful. Of course, courts can
block such unfortunate results by holding that the claims are not made in
good faith. But further restraint is desirable. An employer's reasonableness
in suspecting an employee as well as his good faith in holding such belief
should be considered. If the asserted grounds for doubt about loyalty take the
form of protected "political activity," such belief should be held unreasonable
and the statute held violated.
Even so interpreted, such statutes provide scant protection against unwar-
ranted discharge based on suspicions of disloyalty. Most are penal in nature."3
And even where a civil action for damages is allowed, the burden of proof
is virtually prohibitory.- Only where the employer admits that the discharge
is on loyalty grounds, as in the Lockelwed case, is there possibility of success.
Unless the statute allows punitive damages, the damages recoverable in a
civil action may not be worth the effort.
4 5
ever, and they will have no means of keeping alive except to become agitators 4-f a dan-
gerous sort."
Chafee, Thirty-Five Years with Freedom of Speech, 1 KAN. L R-v. 1, 15 (1952). For
other dissents from the prevailing policy, see, e.g., BAnTH, op. cit. sispra note 1; O'Brian,
iTew EizcroaclJments on Individual Freedom, 66 HARv. L RLv. 1 (1952).
42. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 23 Cal.2d
481, 485, 171 P.?d 21, 24 (1946).
43. See note 24 supra. The Supreme Court of California held in the Locklccd cafe,
supra note 42, that its statute impliedly created a civil right of action. For a recent cafe
discussing whether a civil right of action will be implied from a criminal statute, see
Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1953).
44. There have been relatively few prosecutions or civil actions under any of these
statutes because of the difficulties of proving violations by employers. This problem has
been much discussed in connection with fair employment practices legislation. See cita-
tions note 14 supra. Enforcement of the various labor relations acts is generally more
easily accomplished because administered by boards with broad powers to investigate and
hear complaints, because anti-union activities are often more overt, and because the
criminal burden of proof need not be met.
45. See, e.g., Harmon v. United Mine Workers of America, 166 Ark. 255, 205 SAV.
84 (1924) (no damage to employee from discharge from employment terminable at will) ;
Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1953) ("Where a contract
of employment expressly empowers an employer to terminate the contract upn giving
notice, recovery for wrongful breach is limited to the notice period."). But cf. Barile
v. Fisher, 94 N.Y.S2d 346 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (damages include loss pending new job).
And see note 35 suPra.
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FEDERAL STATUTES
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended by Taft-Hartley, 40 repre-
sents the principal federal restraint on an employer's right to discharge. Al-
though there is nothing in the Act prohibiting an employer from discharging
an employee suspected of subversive activity,47 the NLRB is given the power
to make a factual determination of the actual motive for any discharge. Re-
gardless of the declared motive, if the Board finds that the real reason for
discharge is illegal under the Act, the employer may be held guilty of com-
mitting an unfair labor practice.
48
Prior to the Korean emergency the attitude of the National Labor Relations
Board toward private loyalty measures might be characterized as one of great
suspicion. Before 1950 the defense that an employee was fired because he was
suspected of disloyalty was thus closely scrutinized and usually rejected as
not the real reason for the discharge in actions for discriminatory firing.40
46. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946), as amended by the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (Supp. 1952).
47. In its Third Annual Report the NLRB stated that it:
"... has been careful not to interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the
employer to select employees or to discharge them. . . .The Board has never held it
to be an unfair labor practice for an employer to hire or discharge, to promote or demote,
to lay off ... for asserted reasons of business, animosity, or because of sheer caprice, so
long as the employer's conduct is not wholly or in part motivated by anti-union cause."
3 NLRB, ANN. Rx,. 65 (1938).
48. Among -the acts declared to be unfair labor practices for an employer are:
to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to organize
or refuse to organize or to engage in or refuse to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; by discrimination to
encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization; to discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under
the Act. 61 STAT. 140-1 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (Supp. 1952).
49. See, e.g., Pusey, Maynes & Breish Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 482 (1936); Cincinnati Mill-
ing Machine Co., 9 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 3 LAB. Rzm. REP. (Ref. Man.) 289 (1938), petition
to review dismissed, 102 F.2d 979 (6th Cir. 1939) ; The New York Times Co., 26 N.L,R.B.
1094 (1940) ; Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 502 (1941) ; Franque A. Dickins,
64 N.L.R1B. 797 (1945). Cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Fulton Bag & Cotton
Mills, 180 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1950); National Linen Service Corp., 48 N.L.R.B. 171
(1943).'
In Cincinnati Chemical Works, Inc., 51 N.L.R.B. 461 (1943), the discharge of a union
organizer for making unpatriotic statements was held to be discriminatory where the
employer only superficially investigated and failed to question the employee prior to dis-
charge. But in National Labor Relations Board v. Cincinnati Chemical Works, Inc., 144
F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1944), the court denied enforcement of the Board's reinstatement order
saying:
"We do not conceive that in enacting a law in time of peace for the furtherance of
peaceful industrial relations, Congress intended to foreclose the courts of the United States
in reviewing Labor Board decisions from functioning even independently enough to pro-
tect the nation from the danger of subversive activity in munition plants in time of war.
. ..We cannot believe that Congress contemplated to set up the Labor Board so high
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But since 1950 a change has occurred. Two administrative rulings of the
General Counsel of the Board issued early in 1951 ug demonstrate that an
employer now has wide leeway to discharge without fear of an unfair labor
practice charge. In both cases the General Counsel sustained regional
directors' refusals to issue complaints alleging discriminatory suspensions of
employees. Evidence that the employer, in effectuating the suspensions, was
motivated by, and acted in good faith reliance upon, belief that the discharged
employees were communists was sufficient justification for the refusal.51 Since
above the federal courts that a United States Circuit Court of Appeals in time of war
would be compelled to direct the reinstatement in a chemical plant of a discharged em-
ployee who, despite a contrary finding by the Board, is believed by this court upon the
evidence of record to have stated the day following Pearl Harbor that he hoped the Japs
would sink some more U.S. ships...." Id. at 59S-9.
As to widening of the scope of judicial review of XLRB decisions under the Taft-
Hartley Act, see Wol r, LABO-, RrrIO.NS k.m Ft nm",. L.w 24 (1949).
Similar problems could arise under state labor relations acts, see note 227 sufra, but
no such case has been discovered.
50. Administrative Ruling of NLRB General Counsel, Case No. 63 (March 7, 1951),
27 LAB. Ri.. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1443 (1951); Administrative Ruling of NLRB General
Counsel, Case No. 72 (March 30, 1951), 27 LxB. Rr. RE. (Ref. Man.) 1510 (1951).
See also Stewart-Warner Corp., 94 N.L.R.B. 607, 633 (1951), order set aside, 194 F.2d
207 (4th Cir. 1952), discussed at length in NATIOxAL InDU5STAL Cozzr.nu.cn BQ.VA,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 64. See Ncw Grounds for Firing, Business Week, Apr. 14, 1951,
p. 31 (commenting on the "shift" in NLRB policy and recommending employer action).
51. The suspended employees involved in General Counsel Ruling in Case No. 63,
supra note 50, were named as defendants in a libel suit instituted by two resigning officers
of their own union. The suit denounced the union as communist-dominated and charged the
individuals with being members of the Communist Party. Shortly after the institution
of the suit the company suspended the complainants and in a letter to them state.d: (1)
if the charges in reference to their communist affiliations were proved correct it was
deemed in the best interests of the company that they be suspended; (2) if the charges
were proved false to the satisfaction of the company within one year the employc s would
be reinstated. The company based its belief that the employees were communists both on
the charges in the pending libel suit and their past public assuciation with, and partici-
pation in the activities of, a number of alleged communist-front organizations.
The facts in the second ruling indicate that an employer today has great leeway. In
that case the facts as found by the regional director were: the employee in question ,as
expelled from his union following publication in a newspaper of a petition supporting
the Stockholm Peace Pledge, which the employee signed, adding the union name after
his signature. Following this publication the employee's fellow workers demonstrated
resentment against him and this caused unrest in the plant. In upholding the denial of a
complaint, even though the union had a security agreement and had requested complain-
ant's discharge (see text accompanying note 59 infra), the General Counsel held:
"[T]he underlying reason for the discharge was the individual's suspected com-
munist activity, which xas resented by the employees and the union, and was a subject
of great concern to the employer if only for the reason that it caused considerable unrest
among the employees. This alleged activity ,as, of course, not protected by the Act and
a discharge because of it would not be an unfair labor practice." Administrative Ruling
of NLRB General Counsel, Case No. 72 (March 30, 1951), 27 LAu. RE.. REP. (Ref.
Man.) 1510 (1951).
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there is no appeal from a refusal to act by the General Counsel,62 an em-
ployer can avoid trial-examiner or NLRB inquiry into an anti-union charge
merely by convincing the General Counsel of his good faith belief of the dis-
charged employee's communist ties.
The NLRB also appears particularly solicitous of any employer action
claimed justified by federal security regulations." In one case the Board held
that it would not require reinstatement of an employee discriminatorily dis-
charged where it was shown that the Government refused to consent to his em-
ployment on its contracts; and it would not require back pay for any time after
which the employer had notice of such refusal5 4 Moreover, a recent General
Counsel ruling sustained a regional director's refusal to issue a complaint
alleging that a defense contractor had discriminatorily discharged two em-
ployees because of union activities, where the employer had fired both after
their refusal to answer questions on a federal security questionnaire 6 which
required them to list union memberships. One had also refused to answer a
question as to political affilations. The Defense Department subsequently
deleted the question about union membership in the form, and the employees
requested reemployment. But the employer's explanation that it did not wish
to have in its employ workers who had refused to cooperate with the Govern-
ment was considered sufficient justification for denying a complaint.50
A recent circuit court opinion,5 7 however, denotes one limitation on the
type of activity which an employer may, without committing an unfair labor
practice, consider grounds for doubt about an employee's loyalty. In granting
enforcement of an NLRB order requiring reinstatement and back pay to
employees found to have been discharged discriminatorily, the court held that
employees' adherence to a union that had not filed non-communist affidavits
as required by the Taft-Hartley Act "8 was not sufficient grounds for an
employer to suspect their loyalty and therefore discharge them,
Another limitation seemingly imposed by Taft-Hartley on an employer's
right to discharge for disloyalty is more apparent than real. If an employer is
party to a union security agreement he is prohibited from discriminating
against an employee for non-membership in the union, unless membership
52. 61 STAT. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §153(d) (Supp. 1952). See Hourihan v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, 201 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
53. The various federal programs affecting private employees are discussed note 95
infra.
54. Reeves-Ely Laboratories, Inc., 76 N.L.R.B. 728, 735 (1948).
55. NME Form No. 48 (Aug. 1, 1948), now replaced by DD Form No. 48 (Aug. 1,
1950).
56. Administrative Ruling of NLRB General Counsel, Case No. 339 (July 11, 1952),
30 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1303 (1952).
57. National Labor Relations Board v. Pratt, Read & Co., 191 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.
1951).
58. See supra note 7.
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in the union was denied or terminated for failure to tender dues or fees.c
Thus, under such a contract, an employer cannot discharge an employee
merely because that employee was expelled from or denied admission to the
union on grounds of disloyalty.'- But this obstacle is easily avoided if the
employer makes an individual investigation and evaluation of loyalty in each
case; he can then support the discharge directly on grounds of suspected
disloyalty rather than non-membership in the union.0 '
In the light of the history of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board's
approach to private loyalty programs appears justified. The Act was designed
to provide a wholesome atmosphere for collective bargaining and to prevent
employer conduct aimed at discouraging union activityYc2 Aside from such
59. § 8(a) (3), 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (Supp. 1952). See, in
general, Daykin, Union Security Undcr Taft-Hartley. 2 L.XB. UJ. 659 (1951).
60. Kingston Cake Co., 97 N.IR.B. 1445 (1952) (employer guilty of unfair labor
practice for firing, at request of union, employee expelled from membership in union
for refusal to sign a non-communist affidavit). The Board had previously dudged this
issue in the case by holding that the employee was technically not subject to discharge,
Kingston Cake Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 447 (1950) ; but its petition for enforcement of its order
requiring reinstatement and back pay was denied because the employer had acted in good
faith in supposing that the employee -was subject to discharge, and the case was remanded
for consideration of whether the discharge was improper without regard to the technicality.
National Labor Relations Board v. Kingston Cake Co., 191 F2d 563 (3d Cir. 1951).
Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act an employer was permitted to discharge an employee who
had been expelled from his union for communist adherence on the evidence of such ex-
pulsion without being guilty of an unfair labor practice. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 75
N.L.R.B. 1068 (1948).
An indicaton of the reaction of employers to the provision of the Act is found in
It's Hard to Get Rid of A Cown;:unist, Business Week, Nov. 11, 1950, p. 120. Senator
Pat McCarran introduced a bill after the Kingston Cake decision to relieve employers
of any possibility of liability under Taft-Hartley for discharge of employees who volun-
tarily retain membership in any organization on the Attorney General's list. S. 2548, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). The bill yo'as in the form of an amendment to the Internal
Security Acts of 1950. It would relieve the employer but not the union of liability for
securing a discriminatory discharge. See Note, 29 LA. Rt. REP. (Ref. Man.) 147
(1952).
61. Presumably a union can suggest discharge of an expelled member not because
of non-membership but because of his communist activities. In such a situation the NLRB
would have to investigate the procedures and motive of the employer. If the employer
made little independent investigation and acceded to the union's suggestion merely as an
accommodation to the union, the Board would probably find unfair discrimination. But
if the employer made his own investigation and discharged on the basis of his own find-
ings, the union's information serving only as a tipoff, the Board would be unlikely to find
discrimination. See Administrative Ruling of NLRB General Counsel, Case No. 72
(March 30, 1951), 27 L&& RE.. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1510 (1951), discussed note 51 spra,
where the General Counsel sustained the regional director's refusal to issue a complaint
even though the discharge was suggested by the union and a union security agreement
was in effect. And see Note, 29 LAB. REL. RE. (Ref. Man.) 57 (1952).
62. See the findings and declarations of policy in 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1946), and in 61 Srxr. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (Supp. 1952).
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protection of rights of organization and representation, the Act left other re-
straints upon the common-law rights of employers to be determined through
the collective bargaining process. Hence, the policy of refusing to issue unfair
labor practice complaints where an employer discharges an employee solely
on a good faith belief that the individual is disloyal appears entirely defensible.
Unions and the NLRB are alert to prevent such grounds from being used
as a subterfuge for anti-union discrimination. And beyond anti-union conduct
the Act was not meant to go. In fact, Taft-Hartley's provision for non-com-
munist affidavits 0 by union leaders suggests a congressional policy of insti-
gating the discharge of persons of questionable loyalty from jobs as labor
union leaders.
Other federal statutes impose limitations on the right of private employers
to discharge. The Railway Labor Act 64 has provisions similar to Taft-Hart-
ley; special statutes govern the discharge of seamen and provide for damages
upon improper discharge ;5 the Selective Service Act of 1948 00 provides re-
employment rights for veterans and prohibits discharge within one year with-
out "just cause." No case has construed any of these provisions in the context
of employer loyalty measures. But two complaints 67 have alleged that the
federal antitrust 08 laws are violated where a whole industry adopts a loyalty
program. 9
Moreover, the criminal 70 and civil remedy 71 provisions of the Federal
Civil Rights Acts seem on their face to provide some sort of remedy for per-
63. See note 7 supra.
64. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1946), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Supp.
1952).
65. 46 U.S.C. §§ 594 et seq. (1946). These provisions are implemented by Coast
Guard Rules and Regulations, 46 CoDE FED. REGs. § 14 (Supp. 1950).
66. 62 STAT. 614 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. §459(b) (Supp. 1952), as clarified, 65
STAT. 85, 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(g) (Supp. 1952). See, also, Exec. Order No. 10308, 16
FED. REG. 12303 (1951) (Improving the Means for Obtaining Compliance with Ron-
Discrimination Provisions of Federal Contracts). A fair employment practices clause Is
included in all Government contracts and such a clause is required in all subcontracts,
67. Maltz v. Loew's, cited in Marcus, Civil Rights and the Anti-Trust Laws, 18 U.
OF CH. L. Ray. 171, 188 n.94 (1951); The Screen Writers' Guild v. The Motion Picture
Association of America, Civil No. 46-165, S.D.N.Y., 1948, dismissed with permissiom to
amend, 8 F.R.D. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See also, Loew's Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641,
652 n.11 (9th Cir. 1950) (quotation from Mr. Eric Johnston, President of the Motion
Picture Association of America, that one of the reasons why the employers in the motion
picture industry had decided not to make an agreement to refuse to employ communists
was advice of counsel that they would be violating antitrust laws).
68. Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946); Clayton Act, 38 STAr.
731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1946).
69. For an excellent discussion of this allegation, see Marcus, Civil Rights and the
Anti-Trust Laws, 18 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 171, 188 (1951). As to other possible sources
of federal power to prosecute violations of civil rights, see EMERSONx & HAiERe, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 85; Note, 57 YALE L.J. 855 (1948).
70. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-2 (Supp. 1952).
71. 8 U.S.C. §41 (1946).
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sons unjustly discharged on disloyalty grounds.72 But in fact, as presently
interpreted, they offer little protection; and the only suit alleging violation
of these provisions by a loyalty program was recently dropped.73 Under one
of these Acts, any person who, under color of law, subjects an individual to
the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws" shall be liable for damages to the injured party.7 4 And
a similar provision subjects such a person to a criminal sanction.7r Since an
important qualification of both sections is that the deprivation be carried out
"under color" of law, however, few private loyalty measures would qualify
under these restrictions even if job security were considered a right secured
by federal law.
72. For good general discussions of these provisions. see Clark, A Federal Prosecutor
Looks at the Civil Rights Statutes, 47 CoL. L. REv. 175 (1947); Fraenkel, The Federal
Cizql Rights Laws. 31 fMim-. L REv. 301 (1947) : Gressman, The Unhappy Hisor.o of
Cizil Rights Legislatim, 50 MicH. L. REv. 1323 (1952): Sloan, Federal Ci-1 Rights
Legislationi and the Constitntion, 1 S.C.L.Q. 245 (1949); Comment, Jurisdictin over
Violations of Cizil Liberties by State Governments and by Priate Individuals, 39 ,11cr.
L. PEv. 284 (1940). Excellent material may be found in Emraso:, & Harx-, op. cit. supra
note 1, c. 1.
73. Screen Writers' Guild v. The Motion Picture Association of America, Civil No.
46-165, S.D.N.Y. 1948, dismissed awith permission to amend, 8 F.RLD. 4S7 (S.D.N.Y.
1948). Petitioners' Amended Complaint, pp. 10-11, alleged:
"In the execution of the conspiracy set forth in this complaint the defendants have
e::ercised and if permitted will continue to exercise over this national industry the powers
ordinarily exercised by a political state in the following particulars. They have
(a) prepared and adopted a code governing the views, the conduct and the associa-
tions of all who write or seek to write screen plays;
(b) reserved to themselves the power to interpret the meaning of that code, acting
in a capacity similar to the enforcing officer of a state;
(c) set up a body acting in capacity similar to a court of law which claims the right
to interpret and adjudge the meaning of the code adopted by the combination;
(d) exercised and threatened to exercise judicial power to adjudge what conduct and
activity is dangerous to the security of the government:
(e) asserted the right to interpret the Constitution and laws of both the state and the
federal governments in order to adjudge whether belief, conduct or associations tend to
the overthrow of the government by illegal and unconstitutional means;
(f) asserted the right to carry out and have carried out the decrees of this illegally
constituted court by the drastic banishment from the motion-picture industry of any writer
condemned by the combination; and
(g) having acquired control, through concerted action, over the livelih fd and prop-
erty of every person writing for the screen is exercising that control as a political state
would exercise it;
all to the lasting and irreparable damage of the plaintiffs."
74. 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1946). This section provides that such a person shall be liable
to the injured party "in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper prceeding for
redress."
75. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Supp. 1952). A fine of not more than $1000 or imprisonment
for not more than one year are prescribed as penalties for violation of this provision.
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Another provision of one of the Civil Rights Acts makes it a criminal offense
for "two or more persons" to "conspire to injure, oppress, threaten or intimi-
date any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States." 70 Further-
more, as a remedy for conspiracy to deny certain enumerated rights, an injured
party is given an action for damages. 77 The Supreme Court in Collins v. Hardy-
man,78 however, has restricted the latter provisions to situations where the in-
vasion of rights has been accompanied by "some manipulation of the law or its
agencies to give sanction or sanctuary for doing so."'79 Moreover, courts consis-
tently interpret the phrase "any right or privilege secured .. .by the Con-
stitution" in the conspiracy sections as protecting only rights of "national
76. 18 U.S.C. §241 (Supp. 1952). Fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment
for not more than 10 years, or both, are prescribed punishments.
77. 8 U.S.C. §47(3) (1946). This provision reads:
"If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering
the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons
within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons
conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled
to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of
the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice-President,
or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or
property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in
this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in
furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of tlhe
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the con-
spirators."
78. 341 U.S. 651 (1951). This case is discussed in Frantz, The New Suprene Court
Decisions on the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 11 LAw. GuiLw REv. 142 (1951); Gress-
man, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislatio?, 50 MIcn. L. Rnv. 1323, 1356
(1952) ; Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil
Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361 (1951). Cf. Thompson, Protection of Privileges and Itti-
mnurnties of United States Citizens Against Interference by Individuals, 1 DoKx B,AJ.
63 (1951).
79. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 661 (1951). The complaint alleged violation
of the first clause of §47(3), note 77 sara. The Court said: "What we have here is
not a conspiracy to affect in any way these plaintiffs' equality of protection by the law,
or their equality of privileges and immunities under the law. There is not the slightest
allegation that defendants were conscious of or trying to influence the law, or were
endeavoring to obstruct or interfere with it." Ibid. But the court left one loophole: "We
do not say that no conspiracy by private individuals could be of such magnitude and effect
as to work a deprivation of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and im-
munities under laws." Id. at 662. Justices Burton, Black and Douglas dissented, arguing
that the provision created a cause of action in favor of persons injured by private in-
dividuals through abridgement of federally created constitutional rights. Id. at 663, 664,
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citizenship" ;so and these rights do not include the right to a job.s1 Thus the
only possible utility of these Acts to discharged employees would be the
criminal conspiracy provision, which prohibits the deprivation of rights given
by "laws of the United States." In United States v. Waddel 2 the Supreme
Court held that this provision applied where private individuals interfered
with a person's right to establish a claim under the homestead acts. Logical
extension of this theory would prohibit a conspiracy to deprive a person of
his rights under any federal statute, including those restricting the employer's
right to discharge.sm But the scope of these statutes is so narrow that this
additional criminal sanction imposes little restraint on loyalty measures.
Although the Civil Rights Acts in no way explicitly cover problems raised
by private loyalty programs, a willing court could, within the framework of
present decisions, nevertheless find significant restraints on private loyalty
programs in the conspiracy provisions. The rights the Federal Government is
constitutionally empowered to protect against private citizens under these
provisions have long been narrowly construed.84 But the rights of a qualified
voter to participate in a federal election or to run for federal office have
consistently been protected.85 A conspiracy "to injure, oppress, threaten or
intimidate" a citizen in the exercise of these rights could be found in a dis-
charge on loyalty grounds if the finding of disloyalty were supported only
by proof of conduct representing legal federal political activity. Moreover,
courts could reasonably extend their definition of the rights which Congress
can constitutionally protect against interference by private individuals. The
Constitution guarantees a republican form of government.80 This implies
80. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1,W); United States v. Cruihshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1875) ; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1872).
81. See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (9Mt); Ferrer v. Fronton Exhibition
Co., 189 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Love v. Chandler. 124 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1942) ; cf.
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 231
(1920); Powe v. United States, 109 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denicd, 309 U.S. 679
(1940); Bradwell v. State, 16 XVal. 130 (U.S. 172) ; Mitchell v. Greenough, 100 F.2d
184 (9th Cir. 1938).
82. 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
83. Commentators agree with this interpretation. See KoNTrz, THE CoexsnTuzoN
AND CiviL RiGHTs 44-5 (1947) ; Clark, ipra note 72, at 181; Gressman, supra note 72,
at 1347 n.74; Rogge, Justice and Civil Liberties, 25 A.B.A.J. 1030 (1939) ; Comment, 39
MicH. L Rzv. 284, 296 (1940). Cf. Pennsylvania R.R. System v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
267 U.S. 203 (1925); Schatte v. International Alliance, 1,2 F2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950).
And see the unreported cases discussed in Emnasoq & I-% E, op. cit. supra note 1, at 70.
84. See note 80 szpra.
85. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Er Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). Cf. Snovwden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1
(1944). Other protected federal rights are the right to have a ballot in a federal elcction
fairly counted, United States v. Mosley, 23 U.S. 383 (1915), and to be free from mob
violence while in the custody of a federal officer, Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263
(1892), and to inform authorities regarding a federal offense. In re Quarles and Butler,
158 U.S. 532 (1895).
86. U.S. GoNsT. Art. IV, § 4.
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a right of citizens to engage in any legal political activities, federal or state.,1
Discharge because of such political activities could be held an attempt to in-
timidate the enjoyment of this right. This would prohibit employers from
conspiring to discharge on loyalty grounds employees proved only to have
participated in protected political activities. Of course, both rationales require
holding that discharge from a job to which an employee has no "right" con-
stitutes intimidation. But this is but recognition of reality.
From a practical viewpoint, however, there is little likelihood that the
Supreme Court will accept this position. Six justices in the Collins case 88
were unwilling to interpret the civil conspiracy provision as restricting a
forcible break-up of a political meeting by a group of private individuals. It
is therefore unlikely that they would find that an unsupported disloyalty dis-
charge constituted a deprivation of a federally-protected right. Moreover, even
if the statute were explicitly extended to prohibit private loyalty programs,
the Court might hold such an extension unconstitutional.89
COLLECTIvE BARGAINING CONTRACTS
Probably the most important present restraint upon employers' freedom
to discharge is the existence of collective bargaining contracts.0 0 Almost all
such union-negotiated agreements now contain provisions restricting manage-
ment's power to discharge employees.91 Some of these contracts recognize
87. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1870): "The right of the
people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of
grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the national
government, is an attribute of national citizenship and, as such, under the protection of,
and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican in
form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances."
Referring to these statements, the Court in the Collins case, said: "In the light of the
dictum in United States v. C'ruikshank . . ., we assume, without deciding, that the facts
pleaded show that defendants did deprive plaintiffs 'of having and exercising' a federal
right which, provided the defendants were engaged in a 'conspiracy set forth in this
section,' would bring the case within the Act." Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 660
(1951). See also Robeson v. Fanelli, 94 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
88. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
89. See cases cited in note 80 supra, and United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
In Collins v. Hardywnan, the Court said, "It is apparent that, if this complaint meets the
requirements of this Act, it raises constitutional problems of the first magnitude. .. "
341 U.S. 651, 659 (1951). The Court dodged these constitutional issues by holding that
the conspiracy alleged was not included under the Act. Cf. United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941).
90. About one-third of the more than fifty million Americans in non-agricultural
employment are now unionized. THE WORLD ALMANAC 308, 394 (1953).
91. BNA, COLL. BARG. NmoT. AND CONT., CONTRACT CLAUSE FINDER 1140:1 (1953).
See also P-H UNION CONT. Smr. 53,520 (1948); U.S. BuRAu LAB, STAT. Bull. No.
908-5 (1948).
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the right to fire as a management prerogative, but allow a discharged employee
to appeal management's decision through regular or special grievance proce-
dures. Most, however, limit permitted grounds for discharge. Many of these
provisions are vaguely worded to allow discharge only "for cause" or "for
legitimate reasons."19 2 In such cases an arbitrator or a board must decide upon
the filing of a grievance whether management's reasons were sufficient. 0 3 Thus
even the vaguest of these contractual restrictions ameliorates the common-
law rule by both forcing an employer to state and prove his reason for every
discharge and by requiring that such reason not be arbitrary in the estimation
of an impartial judge.
Both before and since the Korean War, arbitrators and courts have uni-
formly agreed that, no matter what the collective bargaining provision, Govern-
ment security provisions supersede the contract and justify discharge.Y' This
is true despite the fact that most of the federal security programs affecting
non-Governmental employees do not require that a person denied clearance
be fired.93 For example, the contract of a Defense Department contractor
92. BNA, CoIL_ BARG. NEGoT. AND CONT., Comrn'cT CLt-SE Fr nwm rr 40:1 ct seq.
(1953).
93. See, generally, CHAmam.nL.UN, CoLLcmTIV BARGAINING (1951).
94. See, e.g., the statements in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. of Cal., 4 Am. L.
Anm. AwARDs T6,778 (1951) ; Bell Aircraft Corp., 16 L,%. -Am. Rr. 234 (1951); Cur-
tiss-WNright Corp., 9 LAn. Ann REp. 77 (1947); Sperry Gyruscope Co. v. Engineers'
Ass'n, 279 App. Div. 630, 107 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 5,2, 107 N.E2d
78 (1951). See also Lockheed Aircraft Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
23 Cal2d 481, 171 P.2d 21 (1946) ; cf. Consolidated Western Steel Corp., 13 LD. Aa..
REP. 721, 726 (1949). But cf. HOUSE Conrrrn oN UN-Aimnic.%z.- AcrImIrTi, ANN-.
Rm. 15 (1951), where it was reported that an empkyee denied clearance by the Navy
was still working on a defense contract because of union opposition to removal. Further
facts were not given but legislation to obviate this situation was recommended.
95. The Federal Government has several security programs that affect non-Guvern-
mental employment. But to date the primary Government control has been the power to
refuse Government contracts. Even to bid on defense or atomic energy contracts an em-
ployer needs clearance of his facilities, physical and human. If a contract is awarded it
will contain a securit, clause and the AEC or the Defense Department vill retain the
right to screen all officers, directors, and owners of the enterprise as well as key em-
ployees. Any employee coming into contact with classified materials must first be cleared
by the government. The clearance procedure involves fingerprinting and filling out a
detailed questionnaire which is forwarded to the contracting agency. After investigation
the employer and employee are notified of grant or denial of clearance. A person denied
clearance generally may appeal to review boards set up for this purpose. These Govern-
ment agencies can terminate a contract without liability if the employer fails to cooperate
in security measures or does not receive clearance on security check. See MurNao:.s
BOARD, INDUSTRIAL SECUrnTY MANUAL FOR SArEGuAnR= CXAssIFID SECurMTY I.,70n-
YATiON (Dep't Def. 1951); MU rrioNs Bo.ARD, How To BE CtREAn.O FMa HANLSUNG
CLAssrsIz M LITARY I-uORATIox WITHIN INDUSTRY (Dep't Def. 1951) ; 10 Co-zn FED.
REGS. §§ 4.1-4.20 (Supp. 1952) (AEC security clearance procedures).
An act of 1926, 44 STAT. 787 (1926), 10 U.S.C. § 310(j) (1946), restricts eligibility
for award of Government aircraft contracts to citizens or corporations with a specified
amount of their capital stock citizen-owned and their board of directors citizens. It further
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provides that only uncleared employees must be denied access to classified
information and facilities. And under such a contract, one employee was dis-
charged because he was denied initial clearance by the Army-Navy-Air Force
Personnel Security Board on undisclosed grounds. Although the employee
was subsequently cleared on appeal to the Industrial Employment Review
Board,96 the arbitrator held that he was not entitled to an award of pay from
the employer for the period he was unemployedY7 Thus even this erroneous
provides that no alien shall have access to plans or shall participate in such contracts
without clearance from the secretary of the department concerned. In a 1942 memo,
Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson reconciled this provision with the anti-
discrimination clause required in all Government contracts by stating that where there is
no doubt of an alien's loyalty the failure of a contractor to hire and cooperate in gettihg
a clearance is a breach and discrimination. P-H LAB. Rn Srav. 1136,101.1 (1946). See
note 66 sapra. A Joint Regulation of the Armed Forces requires in all classified contracts
inclusion of a provision that contractors shall, when directed by the secretary of any de-
partment, suspend from employment or refuse to employ any person or persons whom the
secretary in the interest of security may designate. 32 CoDE FED. Rmas. § 406.104-12(d)
(Rev. 1951).
Article 7 of the standard Government construction contract (U.S. Standard Form 23)
has a similar provision. It provides that the contracting officer may require the con-
tractor to remove from the work such employees as the contracting officer deems in-
competent, careless, insubordinate, or otherwise objectionable, or whose continued em-
ployment on the work is deemed by the contracting officer to be contrary to the public
interest. I CCH, Gov. CONT. REP. 1f 18,201 (1946). See also Van Knorr v. Miles, 60 F.
Supp. 962 (D. Mass. 1945), remanded for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, 156 F.2d 287
(1st Cir. 1946). Exec. Order No. 10173, 15 FED. REm. 7005 (1950), imposes Governmental
security surveillance in certain instances on employees of employers not necessarily con-
tracting with the Government. That order gives the Coast Guard control of security
clearance of personnel in the merchant marine and on certain waterfront facilities, Hirilg
of an uncleared employee for restricted work is a criminal offense, as is retention in such
employ after revocation of clearance. See Parker v. Lester, 98 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Cal.
1951).
The Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 STAT. 987, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781 et scq. (Supp, 1952),
foreshadows even wider scope to federal control of the loyalty of private employees. While
not prescribing any affirmative duties for management, the Act provides that the Secretary
of Defense shall publish a list of all defense facilities, and that it shall be unlawful for
any member of a communist-action organization to hold a job in such facilities. More-
over, it shall be unlawful for a member of any communist-front organization to seek or
hold a job in such a facility without disclosing such membership. No list has yet been pub-
lished, and the Communist Party is presently contesting its designation by the Subversive
Activities Control Board as a communist-action organization. See Communist Party of
United States v. McGrath, 96 F. Supp. 47 (D.D.C. 1951); 1 SACB, ANN. Rm,. (1951);
EmaEsoN & HABER, op. cit. sapra note 1, at 579 et seq.; McCarran, The Intenial Scalrity
Act of 1950, 12 U. oF Prrr. L. REv. 481 (1951); Comment, [1951] Wis. L. REv, 704;
Note, 51 CoL. L. REv. 606 (1951); note 121 infra.
96. The IERB was the board of last resort to an employee of a Defense Department
contractor denied clearance; this whole review system, however, was recently discon-
tinued by the new Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson.
97. Bell Aircraft Corp., 16 LAB. A.B. REP. 234 (1951). The contract in this case
provided that the aircraft manufacturer could take any reasonable action to comply with
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determination by a Governmental agency that the employee was a poor security
risk was viewed as sufficient justification for dismissal.
The attitude of arbitrators toward the right of employers under "good
cause" contracts to discharge-on grounds of suspected disloyalty--employees
who are not subject to Governmental screening has roughly paralleled the
attitude of the NLRB and its General Counsel. The weight of decisions prior
to 1950 was against allowing discharge in such situations. Four of the six
reported cases held against the employerYs And one of these decisions was
sweeping in its conclusions.19 The arbitrator held that the company could not
discharge an industrial employee for membership in or sympathy with the
Communist Party since it had not been shown that the employee had com-
mitted acts of sabotage or that any real security problem arose from his
continued employment. He went on to say that it is not a crime to be a
member of an organization listed by the Attorney General, and that a man
is entitled to earn a living, even though he subscribes to a theory of govern-
ment or economics that the company deplores, so long as he is acting within
the law. Moreover, in one of the pro-employer decisions 110I an arbitrator
held that a company could not discharge an industrial employee vicrely for his
refusal to testify before a grand jury investigating subversion, even though
the company thought this made the employee's loyalty doubtful. The arbi-
trator felt that the company had no right to make a decision as to loyalty.
Since the charge was so grave, the employee was entitled to legal safe-
guards not present in an employer's action. But the arbitrator held that the
employee could be discharged for missing work while serving time in jail for
contempt, since missing work without leave was a justifiable ground for dis-
charge. Two of the pro-worker decisions involved industrial employees ac-
cused of distributing communist literature,L and the third involved a social
service employee who was allegedly slanting her reports to promote left-wing
politics. 10 2 The arbitrators in all three of these cases felt the penalty too
severe for the facts shown.
security obligations to the Government. After noting that the union had attempted to get
information about the grounds for initial screening from both the Air Materiel Command
and the IERB but had failed, the arbitrator declared: "Here again the Panel greatly re-
grets that the Government Agencies refused to divulge such information. But the Panel
is powerless to do anything about such a situation." Id. at 237. The board refused to
find that reasonable action by the employer would have required finding non-restricted
employment for the employee pending his appeal
98. Foote Bros. Gear & Machine Corp., 13 Lso. Ann. REP. 848 (1949); Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 9 LAB. Ann. REP. 77 (1947) ; Spolmne-Idaho Mining Co., 9 Lm,. A . Ru.
749 (1947) ; National Council of Jewish Women & Social Service Employees Local 19,
2 Ams. LAB. Ann. AwARDs 167,772 (1947).
99. Foote Bros. Gear & Machine Corp., 13 LA. ARn. REP. 84 (1949).
100. Consolidated Western Steel Corp., 13 I.n. Arm. Ra. 721 (1949).
101. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 9 aIun. Ann. REP. 77 (1947); Spolmne-Idaho 'Mining Co.,
9 LAB. APB. REP. 749 (1947).
102. National Council of Jewish Women & Social Service Employees Local 19, 2
Am. LA&. ARB. AwARns 67,772 (1947). In this case the employee was reinstated with-
1953]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
In the other pre-Korea case, decided for the employer, the arbitrator did
not base his decision squarely on disloyalty. A newspaper had published re-
ports that an industrial employee was a member of the National Committee
of the Communist Party under an alias, and that he was active in soliciting
party membership in the city. The company contended that these reports had
led to unrest and dissension in the plant with a consequent loss of production;
and it presented a petition from fellow employees protesting working with
the alleged communist. The arbitrator held that under the discharge "for
legitimate reason" provision the company was not required to retain an em-
ployee who caused unrest in the plant.103
In four of the five cases reported since 1950 involving the discharge of sus-
pected subversives under general contract provisions, the employers have been
upheld.10' And in the other case the disloyalty charges were apparently a
out back pay on the theory that both employer and employee were at fault. The arbitrator
found that the employee had not been adequately trained for her job, did siot have ade-
quate supervision or leadership, and had never been corrected or warned. And while he
stated that the "Council has the indisputable right to avoid subversion of its policies,"
he also noted that "this area secretary has not been charged and is not found to be a
Communist. She has sworn her complete loyalty to the United States and to its demo-
cratic princples. .. ."
103. Jackson Industries, Inc., 9 LAB. ABB. Ra. 753 (1948). The union defended
on the ground that if the employer were allowed to discharge on the basis of unsupported
charges of disloyalty the job security of all employees was endangered, The arbitrator
noted that if the charges were false the discharged employee had a remedy in a suit for
defamation. "If they were true, so that he is without a remedy in the courts, then the
loss of his job was brought about as a natural consequence of his own voluntary acts,
which he might reasonably have foreseen would produce just such a result. The rights of
freedom of thought and of speech are valuable rights, but no company is under a duty to
protect those rights at the sacrifice of its existence." Id. at 754.
104. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. of Cal., 4 AM. LAB. Aim. AWARDS 1 68,778 (1951)
Publishers' Ass'n of New York City, 19 LAB. Aim. REP. 40 (1952); Publishers Printing
Co., New Haven Evening Register, Oct. 8, 1952, p. 25, col. 3; Los Angeles Daily News
Co., 19 LAB. ARB. REI. 39 (1952). See also the two decisions following the visit of the
House Un-American Activities Committee to Detroit in 1952. Chrysler Corp., Chrysler-
Jefferson Plant, 19 LAB. ARE. REP. 408 (1952), did not involve a discharge but the loss
of part of a day's pay. The employee had been sent home by management because they
thought his presence in the plant would cause trouble since he had been named as a com-
munist at one of the hearings of the Committee. The employee involved denied in writing
that he had ever been a communist and management made no allegation of disloyalty,
The arbitrator held that the employee must be paid for the time he lost because to sustain
the employer's action would result in imposing a penalty "not against, those who may
threaten trouble or interference with production but against an employee who was will-
ingly and properly performing his job." Chrysler Corp., Dodge Main Plant, 19 LAB. Aim,
REP. 221 (1952), involved discharge of a person named before the Committee as a com-
munist. The employee, a union leader who had signed a non-communist affidavit, was dis-
charged for distributing literature denouncing the Committee in the plant. The arbitrator
held that discharge was too severe a penalty in view of the employer's previous laxity in
enforcing its rule prohibiting distribution of literature in the plant. The employee's action
was felt to merit severe penalty, however, since as a union official she must have known
[Vol. 62: 954
LOYALTY AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
subterfuge to eliminate an active union organizer.20 Three of the pro-em-
ployer cases involved newspaper employees, 10 and the other involved an
employee in a defense plant1 °7
The Los Angeles Daily News arbitration. 03 decided by a five-man arbi-
tration board, is the most recent of these cases. Two members of the news-
paper's editorial staff were named by former communists testifying before the
House Un-American Activities Committee as their one-time fellow members.
Both men refused either to affirm or deny the charge. As a result, the em-
ployer fired one and refused to rehire the other, who had not been worldng
but was on the rehire list when the charges were made. The local union 163
pressed the employees' grievance and insisted upon arbitration on the ground
that the discharge and failure to rehire were not for "just and sufficient cause"
as required by the collective bargaining agreement. But a majority of the
arbitration board upheld the employer on the theory that a newspaper has a
"quasi-public responsibility" and that management thus "has a right to e--
pect its employees who are so accused to answer these charges." Because of
the refusals of the two employees to refute the charges, unfavorable public
opinion could cause the employer severe financial loss if it did not take action
to instill public confidence in its policies." 0
This decision goes further than any other reported arbitration in holding
the factors present sufficient to justify discharge. The arbitrators e-xplicitly
ruled that nobody had proved either of the two editors to be a communist;
and the publisher admitted that the one who was working was very able and
of the no-distribution rule, and that the controversial literature she was distributing would
incite trouble. The discharge was therefore reduced to six months' layoff without pay and
without accumulation of seniority or other rights.
105. Cutter Laboratories, 15 LAB. Ann RE. 431 (1950), aff'd sub now. Cutter
Laboratories v. Bio Lab Union, 16 LA. Am REP. 203 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1951). Although
there was some evidence in this case that the discharged employee was a member of the
Communist Party, the arbitrator found that the employer knew this for over tvo years
and had thus waived it as a ground for discharge. Moreover, the discharged employee
was a union officer at the time of her discharge and the employer was in the midst of a
dispute with the union.
106. See note 104 supra.
107. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. of Cal., 4 Am. LAn. Ann AwArls ff 63,778 (1951).
103. 19 LAn. AR& REP. 39 (1952). See Editor and Publisher, Aug. 16, 1952, p. 9;
Time, Sept. 1, 1952, p. 48.
109. The American Newspaper Guild. It found itself in a somewhat anomalous posi-
tion since it had recently fought hard to fire communists from its own paid jobs. Ibid.
110. The board divided 3-2 with impartial arbitrator, Paul A. Dodd, Dean of Letters
and Science at U.C.LA., breaking the union-management deadlock. Dodd wrote that
"the Publisher, in self-defense against anticipated serious financial repercussions brought
on by unfavorable public opinion, has the right under the terms of the working agreement
to ask and expect those accused to clear themselves of the serious charges made under
oath against them, if they are to continue their employment with the Publisher..
Los Angeles Daily News Co., 19 LAn. Ann. REP. 39 (1952).
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had never "slanted" his copy. But the nature of their jobs made the doubts
raised by refusal to testify sufficient to warrant discharge.
In the other recent discharge cases, management has been able to produce
more substantial proof of both disloyalty and injury. Thus one of the printers
whose dismissal was upheld admitted to having been a communist and was
found to have distorted the text of an article to reflect the communist line ;111
the other printer was found to have neglected his duty while participating
in pro-communist activities.1 2 And the industrial employee was found to have
made repeated disloyal statements to fellow employees on company time and
thus to have abused his "captive audience."" 3
These cases involving discharge of employees suspected of disloyalty under
"good cause" contracts are too few in number to provide a basis for very
extensive generalization on the attitude of arbitrators and courts. The decisions
both before and since the Korean War suggest, however, that in any situa-
tion in which the employer suffers actual injury through retaining in his
employ a person of questionable loyalty, the employer has "good cause" for
the discharge. Thus unrest in the plant, loss of consumer patronage, or damage
to equipment appears to be sufficient justification. But the post-1950 opinions,
all of which involved relatively sensitive jobs, seem somewhat more will-
ing to find such injury than did those prior to that time. And in the
Daily News arbitration, the arbitration panel appeared to feel that po-
tential injury to an employer was enough. Since a failure to act promptly to
eliminate persons of questionable loyalty from key positions on his staff might
destroy public confidence, the employer was justified in acting immediately
even though there was relatively little evidence of disloyalty. 14 The decisions
allowing discharge where Government security clearance is denied accord
with this rationale that potential damage, based on reasonable grounds for
doubting loyalty, is sufficient. In fact, the very theory of the security pro-
grams is the denial of clearance to persons who are potentially dangerous
to the facilities.1'5
111. Publishers' Ass'n of New York City, 19 LA. ARB. REaP. 40 (1952). The printer
was found to have substituted the phrase "American system of facism and security" for
"American system of freedom and security." The board found that the substitution was
"too pat to suggest error; on the contrary, its very aptness suggests willful substitution,"
and that "the type as set represented a disloyal distortion of text in defiance of the spirit
and sense of the article in question. Whether it was deliberately done by Ross or was
the inadvertent or subconscious response of his communistic distaste for the subject mat-
ter it demonstrated his unsuitability for continued employment."
112. Publishers Printing Co., New Haven Evening Register, Oct. 8, 1952, p. 25, col.
3. Discharge was upheld on the theory that the employee neglected his duty by participat-
ing in pro-communist propaganda while vacationing in Europe, and by repeating anti-
American propaganda of the communists in speeches before groups of laborers.
113. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. of Cal., 4 Am. LAB. Apx. AWARDS 68,778 (1951).
114. See note 110 supra. Cf. Chrysler Corp., Chrysler-Jefferson Plant, 19 LAD. ARD.
RaP. 408 (1952), discussed note 104 supra.
115. See note 95 mtpra.
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The question of whether or not mere membership in the Communist Party
would constitute "good cause," absent any showing of injury, however, re-
mains somewhat in doubt. Arbitrators in several of the pre-1950 cases refused
to allow discharges purely on that basis, pointing out that the Communist
Party had not been outlawed.116 And one case suggested that although dis-
loyalty might be sufficient cause for discharge, only the Government has a
right to prove such disloyalty.117 But the Internal Security Act of 1950 11
and the prosecutions under the Smith Act 119 indicate a shift in public policy
toward the American Communist Party. 'Moreover, one state 10 actually
has outlawed that organization; and the Subversive Activities Control Board
recently branded it a "subsidiary and puppet of the Soviet Union.""' There-
fore, it is possible that arbitrators today might equate membership in the
Communist Party, with disloyalty and hence allow discharge without proof
of injury or prospective injury.' 2  Yet, in point of fact, such a case is not
116. Foote Bros. Gear & Machine Corp., 13 LAn. Aim. REP. 848 (1949).
117. Consolidated Western Steel Corp., 13 LA. .4m. REP. 721 (1949).
118. See note 95 supra.
119. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
120. Georgia. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1953, p. 27, col. 3; id., Feb. 26, 1953, p. 10,
col. 7.
121. New Haven Evening Register, April 20, 1953, p. 1, col. 2. The members of the
board unanimously agreed that the party "is substantially directed, dominated and con-
trolled" by Russia.
122. An insight into the attitude of courts toward discharge on disloyalty alone can
be gained from the only reported case involving discharge under individual employment
contracts. This case involved the "Hollywood ten" and a provision of their contracts
under which each agreed:
"To conduct himself with due regard to public conventions and morals and agrees
that he will not do or commit any act or thing that will tend to degrade him in societ)
or bring him into public hatred, contempt, scorn or ridicule, or that will tend to shok,
insult or offend the community or ridicule public morals or decency, or prejudice the
producer or the motion picture, theatrical or radio industry in general." Cole v. Loew's
Inc., 8 F.R.D. 508, 513 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
Four of this group, who had refused to answer questions by the House Un-American
Activities Committee as to whether they were or had ever been communists and were
discharged for such conduct, sued for damages for breach of contract. Upon a motion by
the employer for pre-trial examination of plaintiffs a California court ruled that questions
relating to plaintiffs' conduct as lawful grounds for discharge were permissible. fore-
over, the court ruled that for an employee to be, or to refuse to deny being, a communist
is sufficient ground, as conduct detrimental to an employer's business, to justify the
employer in discharging such employees prior to the termination of his contract of em-
ployment. The court based this conclusion on reasoning that being a communist is defama-
tory per se in California, that the Communist Party is not a recognized political party
in California, and that a person who is unwilling to state publicly whether he is or is
not a communist is regarded as a communist. Cole v. Loew's, Inc., 16 CCH Lan CAs.
1164,974 (Cal. Super. Ct 1949).
Before this decision was reported defendant removed the case to the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of California. See 76 F. Supp. 872 (1943) (de-
fendant's challenge of judge overruled). After a trial by jury it was held that no cause
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likely to arise. Often an employer can show actual injury resulting from
employment of a publicly known communist. And if a showing of poten-
tial injury is accepted as constituting "good cause," virtually any discharge
of a known communist might be so justified.
Evaluation of possible approaches to disloyalty discharge under collective
bargaining contracts presents an extremely difficult problem. On the one hand
is the persuasive argument that all men, regardless of their political beliefs,
should be entitled to earn a living.123 And there are few employment oppor-
tunities open to a man who has once been discharged on an employer's sus-
picion of disloyalty. Furthermore, suspicions of disloyalty are often ground-
less. Many individuals innocently lend their names to subversive groups with-
out realizing the true nature of the organization.1 24 In recognition of the
latter situation, the Supreme Court has recently ruled that knowledge of the
nature of such an organization is a constitutional prerequisite to an oath
which conditions public employment upon a disavowal of membership in any
such group.' 25
On the other side of the scale are considerations affecting the interests of
the employer and the public. Certainly the national security should not be
endangered by a self-righteous solicitude for individual freedom of expression
which forces a private employer to retain a person of doubtful loyalty in a
key position. Nor does it seem proper that an innocent employer should be
forced to suffer economic injury resulting from the outside activities of his
employees. If advocacy of unpopular beliefs is to cause substantial losses,
such losses should fall upon those who can accept or avoid that risk rather
than upon an innocent third party. Furthermore, mere membership in the
Communist Party is highly offensive to public mores. A policy which forces
for plaintiff's discharge existed, and he was awarded damages for all lost employment il
the amount of $78,400. 8 F.R.D. 508 (1948). The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision
because of improper instructions to the jury, particularly in allowing the jury to decide
whether Cole had a right under the contract to refuse to answer questions of the House
Committee. They held that one who conducts himself so as to be guilty of the mis-
demeanor of contempt of Congress could not be said to be acting "with due regard to
public conventions." Since they could not uphold the verdict as a matter of law, the
Ninth Circuit remanded the case for a new trial. In so doing the court stated that the
employer would have been well within his rights in discharging plaintiff if he were a
Communist. Loew's, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950), cerl. denoicd, 340 U.S.
954 (1951). It has since been informally reported to the editors of this JOURNAL that the
litigation was settled out of court prior to a second trial.
123. See note 41 supra.
124. See HousE COMM=ran ON UN-AmERICAN AcrviTixs, ANN. REP. 3 (1952):
"An examination of the testimony of a large group of these witnesses conclusively reveals
that they did not join the Communist Party to participate in any action designed to over-
throw the United States. They joined in some instances to defeat Hitler, or support
labor, and it was only long after their association with the Communist Party that they
learned the true intent and purpose of this organization."
125. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); see Brown & Fassett, Loyalty
Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. OF Cmi. L. REv. 480, 486 (1953).
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an employer to retain an active communist on his payroll purely on the
basis of a "good cause" contract may go far beyond the intention of the parties
who framed that agreement.
The various policy considerations affecting disloyalty discharge under "good
cause" contracts indicate that no clear rule can be established to cover all
cases. In view of the fact that the major purpose of the collective bargaining
contract is to promote freedom from arbitrary employer action, probably the
best that can be hoped for is an impartial balancing of interests in each case.
Actual substantive injury to the employer or public, or a real probability of
future injury, based upon reasonable doubt as to loyalty, should probably con-
stitute "good cause" under almost any circumstances. Less clear is the ques-
tion of whether mere membership in the Communist Party, without any rea-
sonably anticipated injury, should also be "good cause." A major problem
in all cases, however, is one of marking out proper standards of proof. Should
membership in the Communist Party be equated to disloyalty and hence relied
on as a basis for discharge, it would seem proper for the arbitrators to place
a rather heavy burden of proof upon the employer to prove such member-
ship. The proof of injury required, however, should probably be based upon
a reasonableness test-sufficiently flexible to take account of important vari-
ables. Using such a standard, the arbitrator can give appropriate weight to
the nature of the job, the grounds for suspicion of disloyalty, and the degree
of actual or potential injury involved. When such a balancing of interests
indicates that the discharge is not arbitrary but is based upon sufficient evi-
dence of injury to satisfy a reasonable man, a finding of "good cause" within
the meaning of the contract limitation should be entered.
To decrease the problems involved in discharging suspected personnel under
vague contract provisions, employers are increasingly seeking to include in
their agreements explicit provisions allowing discharge of suspect employees. 126
These provisions vary considerably in their breadth depending upon the atti-
tude of the employer and the resistance of the union -2 Although few pro-
126. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CON'FMENCE BoARD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 67; U.S.
BuR EAu OF LAD. STAT., op. cit. supra note 91, cl- 25; BNA, COLL. BAnG. Nncor. Am
CONT., CoN Acr CLAUSE FINDER 40:14 (1953) ; 1 BNA, LAB. POL. AND PRAC 26:590
(1953). Cf. Standard Generator Service Co. of Mo., Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 790 (190) (in-
sistence on requirement of anti-communist and anti-socialist oath from all union leaders
held to evidence bad faith bargaining by the company).
127. See, e.g., the provision in the agreement between the A.F. of L Chemical
Workers and Southern Counties, Cal., Gas Co.:
"Any of the following shall constitute causes for demotion, discharge or disciplinary
lay-off, except that advocacy of the overthrow of the government by force and violence,
or commission of or conspiracy to commit any act of sabotage, or to engage in any sub-
versive activity, shall be an immediate cause of dismissal: [list omitted]...."
BNA, CouL. BARG. NEGOT. AND CONT., CoTRAcr CLAUSE FNzDm 140:14 (1953). The
Utility Workers (CIO) and the Consolidated Edison Company in 1949 negotiated a
contract with a provision that all job applicants must state in their applications whether
they belong to "any Communist or other subversive organization." Under this provision
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visions have been construed by arbitrators or courts as yet,128 in at least one
case a court upheld a provision making discharge non-arbitrable where securi-
ty clearance was denied; and it granted a permanent stay of arbitration . 1 2
all employees are required to notify the company and the union if they join such organi-
zation later, and then-present employees were required to take a loyalty oath. Note, 23
LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 8 (1949). Stewart-Warner Corp. and the Int'l Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers (A.F. of L.) included a provision in 1950 to the effect that it is
the policy of the company not to hire or retain communists in its employ, and tliat the
employer is permitted to require a non-communist oath from applicants or employees,
Note, 26 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 14 (1950). On May 7, 1952, the United Auto
Workers and Curtiss-Wright Corp. negotiated an agreement with the following provisions :
"215. In the event that the United States Air Force or any other government agency
concerned with security regulations applicable to the Employer advises the Employer to
restrict any member of the Union from work on or access to classified information or
material, the Union and the International will not hold the Employer responsible for
such action as it (the Employer) may reasonably take to comply with its contractual
obligations to the Government.
"216. Any claim that the Employer has acted improperly in attempting to comply
with the law pertaining to security or with its security agreements with the Government
shall be subject to the grievance procedure and arbitration provisions of this Agreement.
"217. The Union and the International recognize that the Employer has certain obliga-
tions under the law pertaining to security, and in its contracts with the Government as
required by the security regulations of the armed services, and agree that nothing con-
tained in this Agreement is intended to place the Employer in violation of such law per-
taining to security or its security agreements with the Government.'
CURTISS-WRIGHT CORP. (WRIGHT AERO. Div.) AND LOCAL 300, INT'L UNIOXN UNITED
AUTOMOBILE Erc., WORKERS, CIO, AGREmMENT, (1952). See also the reference in Covn-
nmnists on the Job, Fortune, Sept. 1950, p. 47, to the fact that Wright Aeronautical Co.
was unable to negotiate a clause allowing it to fire subversives without consulting the
union. The union stated that it would not oppose Government ordered firings; but it also
stipulated that claims of improper company procedure be taken up under contractual griev-
ance and arbitration provisions. And see the provisions in the contracts involved in
Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 502, 529 (1941); Bell Aircraft Corp., 16 LAn,
ARB. REP. 234, 235 (1951).
128. But see note 122 supra.
129. Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. Engineers' Ass'n, 279 App. Div. 630, 107 N.Y.S,2d 800
(1st Dep't), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 582, 107 N.E.2d 78 (1951). The proceeding to stay arbitration
was originally heard by the Supreme Court for New York County. The agreement per-
mitted arbitration of all disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
contract provisions. It also provided that the discharge of any employee who failed to be
cleared by the proper Government security agencies was not arbitrable. An employee who
was assigned work on a confidential project sought clearance. When no action was taken
on his request for seventeen months, he was suspended by the employer. The union de-
manded arbitration, but the employer moved to stay arbitration on the ground that the
failure of the armed forces to make any determination for such an extended period just[-
fied the employee's discharge without recourse to arbitration. The lower court denied
the motion for a stay on the ground that there was a bona fide dispute about the mean-
ing of the contract provision as applied to the employee in question which should be
determined by the arbitrator. Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. Engineers' Ass'n, 106 N.Y.S.2d
597 (Sup. Ct. 1951). By the time the appeal was heard by the Appellate Division clear-
ance of the employee involved had formally been denied by the Government. The Appel-
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CONCLUSIONS
There are few, if any, real restrictions on private employer loyalty mea-
sures today. Courts are not inclined to interpret existing statutes so as to re-
strain such programs. Arbitrators also are increasingly upholding discharges of
suspected subversives where the employer's action is not arbitrary. And the
NLRB is apparently no longer suspicious of all disloyalty discharges.
Mlost discharges based on suspicion of disloyalty are probably effectuated
without any disclosure of their true nature.130 A majority of the employees in
this country are not protected by collective bargaining contracts '3 1 or the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.1 32 Employers firing such employees need not dis-
close the reason for their action, except in nine states which require an employer
to give a discharged employee a statement of his service and the reason for
his discharge. 1t And even in such states an employer can always find a plau-
sible ground for discharge. Moreover, even where there is an active union,
management is undoubtedly able by using some subterfuge to eliminate un-
wanted employees without publicizing the real reason for discharge.'3 4 Unions
themselves have been known to condone or assist management in easing out
suspect employees. 13 5 In all such cases where the reason for the discharge
is not publicized, the harm to the individual is no greater than if he had been
fired because his employer did not like the color of his hair.
But where doubts as to an employee's loyalty as a ground for discharge are
publicized, the employee suffers harm beyond the loss of his job. Most em-
ployers will not knowingly hire an employee discharged elsewhere on sus-
late Division reversed and granted a permanent stay of arbitration holding that the
changed facts made the discharge justifiable and not arbitrable.
130. See, e.g., NATioxAL INDUSTRUIAL CON-FEENCE BoAna, op. dt, Supra note 4, at 63:
"Where the union is cooperative or where there is no union, companies report that
the best thing to do is to fire men of questionable loyalty. Communist affiliation is rarely
used as the premise since this may be difficult, if not impossible, to prove legally. In-
stead, an infraction of company rules, submission of a false employment application, or
failure to perform work satisfactorily are generally the bases of dismissal. Some com-
panies report, however, that, 'Commies can be awfully good and conscientious worhers
when the heat is on.'
"Security personnel maintain, however, that in the long run, with vigilance and care-
ful 'bookkeeping' of the actions, comings and goings, absences, vacation leaves and any
violations of these or of other company rules, management will be able to get rid of some
of its security risks ......
131. See note 90 supra.
132. The power of the NLRB to prevent persons from engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices is limited by § 10 of the Taft-Hartley Act to such practices "affecting c,.mmerce."
61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. 1952).
133. Fla., Iowa, Ky., Mo., Mont., Neb., N.'M., Okla., Texas. Several Qf these statutes
are very limited. See, e.g., ONA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 171 (1937). Cf. Mol.-T. RE%% Cor'z
tit. 41, § 1311 (1947).
134. See note 130 supra.
135. See, e.g., NATioNAL I-NDUsTRIAL CONFER. CE Bo.%RD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 65
et seq.; Fortune, Sept., 1950, p. 4.
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picions of disloyalty, even though they have no idea of the basis for the sus-
picions.'3 6 And the employee may be stigmatized without ever having a chance
to defend himself. Of course, a party unjustly injured by such a program may
bring an action for defamation against the employer. But such an action is
extremely difficult to win.'3 7 Moreover, the expense of a defamation action
is apt to make this remedy unavailable or undesirable to most employees.
There are other real dangers of abuse in allowing employers free rein with
such measures. Management may employ such a program to circumvent con-
tractual or statutory protections of workers' jobs. And employers can use
such measures to stifle legitimate political views not consistent with their own.
Perhaps other restrictions should be placed on such employer action. There
are, of course, various types of restraints that theoretically could be imposed.
But it is inconceivable that any legislature today would prohibit discharge by
private employers on grounds of disloyalty. To deny to private employers the
right to exercise their own discretion as to the employment of suspected sub-
versives while insisting that no suspected subversives be retained in Govern-
ment employ would be somewhat inconsistent. And it is also most unlikely that
any legislature would circumscribe the employer's common-law right by de-
claring it a crime, an unfair labor practice, or a ground for a punitive damage
action to discharge on grounds of disloyalty without reasonable proof of such
disloyalty. Deeply rooted in American society are the concepts that employers
are free to select their own employees; that employment conditions are subject
to contract and that, absent contract, employment is terminable at will; and
that the availability of a defamation action is adequate protection to indivi-
duals against unjust accusations. These factors, viewed in a context of the
nation engaged in a global struggle with a foe that has proved its mastery
of subversion, make reluctance to enact such restrictive leglislation under-
standable. Since legal restriction is thus impractical and possibly undesirable,
the future of loyalty discharges rests in the hands of the individual employers.
Except for contractual limitations, self-restraint, springing from a moral reali-
zation of the human impact of discharge for suspected disloyalty, appears the
only feasible restriction upon employers' actions.
136. See the remarks of Professor Chafee, note 41 sutpra. A discharged employee
might not even be able to collect unemployment relief. See note 40 supra.
137. See notes 18 and 19 supra.
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